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Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone?
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
Recent scientific innovations, and proposed legislation, have raised questions
about the nature of the constitutional right to reproductive freedom, and in particular
about whether there is a constitutional “right to clone.” This essay urges that as a
matter of substantive due process, rationality review is probably appropriate, and that
restrictions on both reproductive and therapeutic cloning would and should survive
constitutional scrutiny. At the same time, many of the arguments for banning both
forms of cloning are based on ignorance, myths, and speculation. It is extremely
important to distinguish between reproductive and nonreproductive cloning, and it is
equally important to distinguish among the various rationales for banning each. Some
of those rationales have some, but others, including some of the most influential, are
exceedingly weak.

As currently interpreted, the Constitution protects a range of rights involving
marriage, bodily integrity, and reproduction. Does the Constitution guarantee the right
to clone?
The question is not as fanciful as it might appear.1 Cloning is a possible method
for “reproduction.” For some people, cloning would undoubtedly be the preferred
choice. Among this group, some would choose cloning on the ground that it is the
only way to produce children with some genetic connection to them. For such people,
the potential value of cloning should not be understated. And because reproduction is
involved, the individual right to choose might well be thought to fall within the
doctrinal protection given by Roe v. Wade2 and other cases.3 At the same time, it is
not clear that the government can offer constitutionally adequate grounds for
interfering with a presumptively protected right. Some of the most common
justifications seem ignorant or speculative, and others could be taken care of through
narrower means, falling short of a flat ban on cloning. Indeed, the justifications for
banning cloning might well seem, at first glance, to be weaker than the justifications
for banning abortion, which involves the intentional destruction of what many people
consider innocent human life. If government cannot ban the intentional destruction of
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human life, why -- it might be asked -- is government allowed to forbid the intentional
creation of human life?
Notwithstanding these points, I will argue here that under existing law, there is
no constitutional right to clone for reproductive purposes, and indeed that the
argument for such a right is quite weak under the law as it now stands. I will also
argue that there is no constitutional right to clone for therapeutic purposes, though the
analysis must be quite different from that in the reproductive context. In the process of
engaging the legal issues, I will offer a few more general remarks as well. Some of
those remarks involve the appropriate judicial posture in cases involving “substantive
due process.” I will suggest that it is desirable for courts to be extremely cautious in
extending the reach of cases that do not involve an element involving inequality or
some other kind of failure from the democratic point of view. Judicial caution is
justified in light of the complexity of the underlying scientific issues and the existence
of a reasonable debate over the questions of policy and value. These are institutional
points about the value of a general posture of judicial deference in a situation of this
sort.
But some of my remarks bear on the general question whether government
should, in principle, ban reproductive and therapeutic cloning. I do not mean to
resolve those questions here, but I will suggest that many of the most commonly
offered arguments are extremely weak, resting as they do on a mixture of ignorance
and confusion. With respect to nonreproductive cloning, the argument for a
presumptive constitutional right is strained under the precedents; but ironically, the
government’s justifications for intruding on freedom of choice are very weak indeed.
Here as elsewhere, we should distinguish sharply between the legal question and the
political question. The suggestion that there is no constitutional right to clone does not
say whether a reasonable legislature would ban the practice of cloning; and here we
shall see many reasons for doubt. At the very least, we should distinguish between the
strongest justifications, now involving the doubtful safety of the procedure, and the
weaker justifications, based on mistakes of fact or simple distaste.
I. Reproductive Cloning: Is There a Presumptively Protected Right?
For purposes of substantive due process, the first question is whether the right to
clone counts as a fundamental right, one with which the government can interfere only
to protect a “compelling” interest. If there is no fundamental right, the government is
required merely to show a “rational basis” for its action, a much easier burden to
meet.4 I begin with the use of cloning technology for purposes of reproduction.
A. A Puzzling Pattern
This is not the simplest question to answer. The reason is that that the Court has
not—to say the least—given clear criteria for deciding when a right qualifies for
special constitutional protection. The cases leave a great deal of ambiguity and the
4
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doctrine lacks much coherence.5 There are two common ways of reading the cases.
One reading is that the Court has issued a firm “this far, and no more” and is unwilling
to recognize additional fundamental rights unless they find specific and extremely
strong recognition in Anglo-American traditions. This is the argument that Chief
Justice Rehnquist appeared to accept for a majority of the Supreme Court in
Washington v. Glucksberg.6 Of course this approach would not treat cloning as a
presumptively protected right. The other reading is that the cases should be taken to
establish a presumptive right to noninterference with decisions that are “highly
personal and intimate,” at least if those decisions involve choices about sexuality and
reproduction. This approach might well require strong government justification of any
interference with an individual decision to clone. I explore the two approaches in
sequence.
B. Due Process Traditionalism
On occasion influential Justices and the Court as a whole have said that
fundamental rights, under the due process clause, qualify as such largely because of
their origins in Anglo-American traditions, understood at a level of considerable
specificity.7 This was a theme of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in
Glucksberg,8 though Justice O'Connor's separate and narrower opinion draws its status
into doubt. A central goal of due process traditionalism is to discipline judicial
discretion and to draw on views that are time-honored and therefore unlikely to be
idiosyncratic.
Let us for the moment assume that due process traditionalism is correct – that it
describes the appropriate approach to the due process clause. If the right to clone must
emerge from such traditions, the case is simple: There is no such right. The right to
clone is not something that Anglo-American law traditionally protects. Of course we
could say that the absence of a tradition of protection is not relevant, because the
relevant technology is so new. But if such a tradition is a necessary condition for
constitutional protection, there can be no right to clone.
At the same time, there are severe problems with defining fundamental interests
solely by reference to tradition, specifically described. The first problem is that many
of the Court's cases cannot be understood in purely traditionalist terms, and hence the
traditionalist understanding of the privacy cases fits poorly with existing law. Roe v.
Wade is the clearest example; there is no clear tradition establishing a right to
abortion. But this is not true only of abortion. From the standpoint of tradition, a large
number of the Court’s cases make little sense. The cases establishing a right to
contraceptives outside of marriage do not vindicate a longstanding tradition.9 Nor is
5
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there any general right to marry within Anglo-American traditions; hence Loving v.
Virginia,10 striking down a ban on interracial marriage on due process clause, and
Zablocki v. Redhail,11 recognizing a fundamental right to marry, fit poorly with due
process traditionalism. Traditions, taken at a level of specificity and as brute facts,
explain few of the key cases, and hence traditionalism does not make sense of existing
law.
Should the Court consider its own decisions doubtful and use traditionalism in
the future notwithstanding its inconsistency with past decisions? This course has
considerable support within the Court; it is suggested by the Court's opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg, the plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., and
Bowers v. Hardwick.. And such a course might be deemed reasonable if traditionalism
was extremely appealing in principle and if the alternatives were unacceptable.
Perhaps a firm “no more!” would make sense despite its failure to fit with existing
law; the Court's occasionally cavalier treatment of its own precedents implies a
judgment of this sort. But if we assume that at least some kind of substantive due
process is legitimate,12 as all of the Justices appear to assume, we will find large
problems with using traditions, narrowly and specifically conceived, as the sole source
of rights under the due process clause. To be sure, such a use of tradition does help to
discipline judicial discretion, and that is an important gain. And if traditions were
extremely reliable as sources of rights, and if judges thinking more independently
about the appropriate content of rights were systematically unreliable, due process
traditionalism might be justified on balance. That is, due process traditionalism might
be justified as a way of minimizing the costs of decision and aggregate judicial errors
even if it were quite imperfect as a source of rights.
But this is not a very plausible view, for there is no reason to think that
traditions, understood at a level of great specificity, are systematically reliable or so
close to systematically reliable as to exclude a somewhat more reflective and critical
judicial role.13 Anglo-American traditions include a great deal of good but also
significant confusion and injustice (consider, for example, bans on racial
intermarriage); it is sensible for courts to engage in at least a degree of critical scrutiny
of intrusions on liberty even if those intrusions do not offend tradition. Nor is there
sufficient reason to think that judges will inevitably do very badly if they think
critically about rights.
Of course judges should be very cautious about rejecting judgments made by
elected officials; of course judges should avoid hubris in examining the past. Certainly
it is plausible to think that judges should generally proceed incrementally and in good
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common law fashion from previous decisions. It also makes sense to say that
substantive due process should be used sparingly, because of its uncertain textual basis
and because of the unreliability of judicial judgments about which rights should
qualify as fundamental. Understandings of this kind provide important constraints on
judicial power under the Due Process Clause. But at the very least it is appropriate for
courts to ask whether the interest said to qualify as a fundamental right is, in principle,
at all different from rights that have been sanctified by tradition. If, for example, there
were no relevant difference, in principle, between a traditionally-unrecognized right to
clone and (let us suppose) a traditionally-recognized right use contraceptives within
marriage, courts should not say that the latter is constitutionally protected and the
former is not.
C. Reproduction and Sexuality
If tradition is not decisive, what is the source of fundamental rights for purposes
of substantive due process?
1. A False Start. It is tempting to resort to terms such as “intimate” and
“personal”; but these terms provide little help. They tend to be conclusions
masquerading as analytic devices. In any case, some of the cases deny protection to
interests that seem highly intimate and highly personal; consider both Hardwick,14
refusing to recognize a right to homosexual sodomy, and Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas,15 refusing a recognize an associational right to enable people to live together..
Thus the Court's cases refuse to accept the view that intimate and personal decisions
deserve constitutional protection as such. Putting previous cases to one side, we can see
that some decisions that seem intimate and personal are not strong candidates for
constitutional protection. Consider the decision to work longer than the maximum hour
laws allow in order to provide for one's family, the decision to take medicines or drugs
of a certain sort, the decision to marry one's cousin or aunt, or for that matter the
decision to commit suicide. There is good reason to think that the Constitution does not
protect these decisions, however intimate and personal they seem. Thus a reference to
“intimacy” or “personal” decisions is insufficiently unhelpful.
2. Reproduction and Sexuality. But the Court could find a narrower principle
of some appeal, and considerable consistency with the cases, if it said that there is a
presumptive right against government intrusions into the decision how and whether to
produce children. This idea might be invoked to explain both Roe v. Wade and cases
involving governmental efforts to prevent people from diminishing risks of pregnancy.
The suggested standard also has the advantage of distinguishing Bowers v. Hardwick,
the Georgia sodomy case, on the ground that there is no prohibition on the regulation of
sexual conduct if decisions about pregnancy and childbirth are not involved. In any
event, the standard seems to provide a sufficient if not necessary condition for
constitutional concern. There do not appear to be any cases that fail to find a
constitutionally protected interest in cases in which the standard is met.
14
15
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3. Problems and Difficulties. It would not be frivolous to take the precedents in
this way.16 But there are two problems with the argument.
The first is that it is not clear why the right to decide how and whether to
produce children should have this special status, if other rights, such as the right to
choose physician-assisted suicide and the right to engage in consensual sexual activities,
do not. Surely it is true that decisions about reproduction -- about whether and how to
reproduce -- are central to individual autonomy. But many other decisions seem equally
central, or at least not less central, and those decisions do not receive special
constitutional protection. Why should reproduction be singled out? The question
suggests that the cases involving reproduction and contraception may not, in fact, only
involve those issues, and that they may be marked by another feature, one that involves
sex equality. Perhaps issues of that kind also helped motivate the Court. A ban on
abortion has disproportionate effects on women, to say the least; and when a law forbids
the use of contraceptives, women are likely to face especially strong adverse effects, in
the form of an involuntary pregnancy. Indeed, several members of the Court has
acknowledged that Roe v. Wade owes something to equality concerns,17 and it does
seem clear that bans on contraception have disproportionate effects on women.
This equality concern does not appear to be present with bans on cloning. Do
such bans treat women as such worse than men? Do such bans treat any disadvantaged
group especially badly? To be sure, it would be possible to urge that people who are
disabled, in the sense that they lack the ability to produce children in the standard
fashion, are distinctly harmed by bans on cloning. But whenever the government
imposes barriers to use of some medicine or medical technology, there is a
disproportionate burden on those who believe that they need it. By itself that burden is
not enough to create a serious constitutional issue.
The second problem in the argument is that it defines the relevant interests very
broadly, and in a way that is not at all compelled by the cases. People might have a right
to decide whether to abort, and whether to use contraceptives, without also having a
right to choose any available means to have, or not to have, a child – even if that means
is, for some people, the only realistic means. We should agree that it would be
presumptively unacceptable for the government to ban certain couples from having
children, or to impose a one-child policy on the nation. We should also agree that the
government may not require people to have children, and indeed that government may
not bar women from availing themselves of what is, for most people, the usually
indispensable means of preventing the birth of unwanted children (such as
contraception and abortion). But none of this means that there is a presumptive right to
do whatever might be done to increase the likelihood of having, or not having, a child:
to enter into surrogacy arrangements, or to use in vitro fertilization, or to attempt to
clone a child. The central point is that a ban on cloning, or on surrogacy arrangements,
16
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leaves open numerous other channels by which most people may bear a child. If
numerous channels remain open, perhaps the government need not face the strongest
possible burden when it merely closes off one.
The point should not be overstated. There are many means to prevent unwanted
childbirth (I omit the details); abortion and contraception are hardly the only methods.
And for some people, cloning might be the only feasible way to produce a biological
offspring. For imaginable plaintiffs in an imaginable case, a ban on cloning is
effectively a ban on reproduction in the biological sense. It would certainly not be
ludicrous to say that as a matter of constitutional law, the state has to produce a strong
justification for intruding on that choice in cases in which it is the only realistic option.
Indeed there is reason to question a doctrine that would apply strict scrutiny to a ban on
“natural” reproductive practices while applying only deferential review to a ban on new
technologies. But where there is no problem of inequality, courts would probably not,
and should probably not, demand the kind of overwhelming justification that is required
in some cases. Indeed it seems sensible to understand the Court’s precedents as
reflecting special circumstances: the potentially large intrusion on women’s bodies that
is entailed by a ban on abortion or contraception, and the fact that when such bans are in
place, women’s equality is at risk.
II. Reproductive Cloning: State Justifications
I now turn to the arguments that might be offered to justify a ban on
reproductive cloning. These arguments can be taken in two ways. First, they might be
an effort to show that the government has a rational basis for the ban – all that is
required if, as I believe, a fundamental right is not involved. Second, they might be
invoked to show that government has a compelling interest in banning reproductive
cloning – the showing that is required under strict scrutiny. My basic conclusion is that
most of the arguments, and perhaps even all of them, are sufficient to satisfy rational
basis review. I also urge that if a compelling interest must be shown, the most stringent
standard is met by the significant risk that cloning would result in a greater deal of
illness, suffering, and death.
A. Three Weak Arguments
1. Moral Repugnance. In a widely discussed essay, Leon Kass has pointed to
what he calls the “wisdom” of repugnance, and urged that disgust or repugnance is by
itself a sufficient reason to ban a practice.18 There is an interesting claim in the
background here. Perhaps repugnance, even of the visceral sort, reflects a kind of
wisdom and rationality that are superior to readily accessible arguments. Is moral
repugnance, felt by many people, enough to meet the government’s burden?
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The Supreme Court has indicated that it is, at least in the context of a prohibition
of homosexual sodomy.19 And undoubtedly it is true that “disgust” sometimes captures
a sound moral intuition, and that on reflection, we will find that moral repugnance is
based on good grounds. Sometimes repugnance is fully rational. But standing by itself,
and not subject to reason or scrutiny, moral repugnance seems to be a weak basis for
intruding on a human choice. Moral repugnance has been invoked for many bans that
could not easily withstand analysis; consider bans on racial intermarriage or
masturbation. In the context of cloning, moral repugnance might well be a response to
vaguely remembered science fiction stories or horror movies, or to perceptions based on
ignorance and confusion (as in the idea that a clone is a complete “copy” of the original,
or a “copy” that is going to be evil). The real task is to see if moral repugnance can be
defended, not simply asserted.
But these points remain to be translated into constitutional terms. If we are
speaking of strict scrutiny, moral repugnance by itself cannot be sufficient; Loving v.
Virginia20 is enough to establish the point. Moral repugnance must be explained, not
merely asserted. If rational basis review is at work, and if the task is merely to describe
current law, moral repugnance does seem adequate under the authority of Bowsher v.
Hardwick. But there is every reason to be uneasy with this conclusion. Indeed, in the
context of discrimination against the mentally retarded, offense and repugnance were
expressly found to be irrational and hence constitutionally inadequate.21 To uphold a
ban on reproductive cloning, we should seek some other rationale, even under the
rational basis test.
2. Lessening the Worth of Individuals and Threatening Individuality.
Would cloning lesson the worth of individuals? Would it make the clone less of an
individual? The person whose genetic materials were used? Would it diminish the
uniqueness of human identity? Some people appear to think so. No less an authority
than Ian Wilmut has said, “I think that each child should be treated as an individual; and
if you have chosen to make a child, who is a copy of someone who is already here, you
can’t possibly treat that person as an individual.”22 My speculation is that for many
people, the idea of “copying” human beings is unacceptable, simply because of what it
seems to do to the individuals involved.
Here too, however, the argument seems to dissolve on reflection. Wilmut is
making an empirical claim (“you can’t possibly treat that person as an individual”), and
taken as such, the claim is very weak. Identical twins are genetically identical, and the
existence of identical twins does not lesson the worth of individuals, or make anyone
less of an individual. If John and Jim are genetically the same, they are likely to be
similar in many ways for that very reason; but they will not be identical, simply because
they will have different experiences, and experiences affect personality and
development. It is not necessary to set out controversial claims about the precise mix of
19
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genetic endowments and environment in order to make the point. The individuality of
the person whose DNA is used to create a clone would not be compromised by the fact;
nor would the individuality of the clone be affected as a result.23 Indeed, the difference
between cloning and ordinary reproduction should not be overstated on this count.
Many children are extremely close, as a genetic matter, to one or another parent.
If we are speaking of strict scrutiny, a ban on cloning cannot plausibly be
defended on this ground. Simply because rational basis review is so deferential, the
argument from individuality might be sufficient to support a ban. But even here, the
argument is extremely shaky.
3. Genetic Diversity. A species does well if it has a large stock of genetic
diversity. Some people who are concerned about human cloning fear that if it occurs,
the stock will be diminished – making the world, or parts of it, a bit like the English
royal family. If this is a plausible threat, wouldn’t it be legitimate for a state or a nation
to ban cloning for that reason alone?
On reflection, this too is an extremely weak argument, certainly insufficient to
satisfy strict scrutiny, and probably insufficient to satisfy rational basis review. The
reason is that it defies belief to suggest that cloning would become so popular as to
reduce, in any significant way, the existing level of genetic diversity.
B. Three Stronger Arguments
1. Protecting against Suffering and Early Death. The first and simplest
justification is that in light of the current state of medical technology, it is highly likely
that cloned human beings would face serious medical problems -- leading, in many
cases, to serious illness and early death.24 The underlying risks include high rates of
miscarriage, deformed children, premature aging, and high rates of cancer and other
diseases.25 There are possible risks to the mother as well.26
Let us assume that this pessimistic account of the current situation is accurate as
a scientific matter. If it is true, it should be easily sufficient to satisfy rational basis
review. Indeed, it is probably sufficient to satisfy even the most stringent standard of
review, though under that standard, the scientific claims will be investigated closely. If
the claims are taken to be adequate – as prominent groups have concluded27 -- then a
ban is likely to be upheld even if the consequence is to prevent the development of
technology that would reduce the relevant risks. By hypothesis, the practice of cloning
would lead to much suffering and many deaths. The government would seem to have
strong reason to prevent that practice. Compare the question of animal welfare. If
23
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scientists are experimenting with animals in a way that will lead to a great deal of
suffering, the government is certainly allowed to intervene, even if the experiments
would have many benefits too.
There is, however, a possible counterargument. Roe v. Wade held that the
interest in protecting fetal life is not sufficient to override the right of privacy. Suppose
that many or most of the early deaths would involve fetuses, not viable human beings.
Is it not clear, after Roe, that the interest in protecting fetal life cannot overcome the
right to choose? The simplest answer is that strict scrutiny is likely not to be involved,
and hence the interest in protecting fetal life is indeed sufficient. A slightly less simple
answer is that in light of current technology, a ban on cloning would protect fetuses,
young children, and mothers themselves, and hence the question turns out to be easy. If
we are speaking of strict scrutiny, the best answer is that a ban on cloning is justified as
an effort to protect not only fetuses, but also people who are actually born. Even if a
relatively small percentage of clones (10%? 20%?) would suffer in the predicted way,
the state almost certainly has sufficient reason, as a constitutional matter, to ban the
practice.
2. Psychological Harm to the Clone. It is possible to urge that the clone would
suffer psychological harm, even psychological trauma. Imagine the likely emotional
state of someone who knows that he or she is genetically identical to someone who has
already lived a number of years. Perhaps such a person would believe that her future
course was in many ways preordained – that some possibilities were open and others
were closed off. If the clone’s genetic equivalent suffered from high blood pressure, or
diabetes, or cancer, she might believe, with very good reason, that she would face those
problems as well. Other problems are more subtle. If the genetically identical parent
faced a depressing career path, or had unappealing physical features or an unpleasant
smile or laugh, or was badly overweight, it might prove difficult – far worse than
distressing – for the clone.
These are plausible concerns, though they do involve a degree of speculation.
We do not know whether in most or many cases, the psychological harms would be
serious. Identical twins appear to do very well notwithstanding the fact that
psychological harm could be predicted. To be sure, the case of human cloning would be
different, simply because of the age difference between the people involved; the harms I
am discussing would be a product of seeing a life that has run much of its course. But
biology is not (entirely) destiny, and we could easily imagine young people concluding
that even if they are genetically equivalent to one or another parent, or some other living
person, their path is hardly foreordained. Is cloning so radically different, on this count,
from ordinary reproduction? I am not sure.
As far as the Constitution is concerned, however, the issue will be resolved by
selection of the governing standard. If the rational basis test is involved, the arguments
from psychological harm are undoubtedly sufficient. If strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard, the speculative nature of the argument is probably decisive, and the ban could
not be defended on this ground alone.
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3. Use and Exploitation of Human Beings. Of the stronger arguments for
banning reproductive cloning, the third is the most interesting. Imagine a situation in
which cloning was freely permitted – in which individuals could clone themselves, and
in which people interested in children with a certain genetic endowment could assure
themselves of that very endowment. If a family wanted a terrific athlete, it could obtain
a genetic equivalent of, say, Michael Jordan; if it wanted a terrific musician, it could
obtain a genetic equivalent of, say, Bob Dylan; if it wanted a terrific scientist, it could
obtain a genetic equivalent of, say, Ian Wilmut; if it wanted a terrific philosopher, it
could clone John Rawls. Why would this be objectionable? The reason is that people
would be treating their children-to-be as means, with prearranged agendas, rather than
as ends, to seek their own path. Someone who seeks a clone of Michael Jordan might
well have a particular plan in mind for that individual. So too with anyone who has
sought, and been able, to choose people with one or another genetic endowment. In
such cases, the parents would be carefully programming their children’s future, and
likely, perhaps, to keep the program in mind throughout childhood.
Of course this is not altogether different from ordinary life. Many parents have
particular plans for their children. Many parents are insistent on those plans. Sperm and
egg donations depend, in part, on perceptions about genetic endowments. But the
particular programming that I am now discussing cannot be achieved. Perhaps parents
who produce clones will, too much of the time, treat their own children not as ends but
as means.28 If we see a significant increase in that kind of treatment, there would seem
to be considerable reason for concern.
Is this an adequate justification, by itself, for banning cloning? If the rational
basis test is at work, it certainly is; and for reasons suggested above, rational basis
should be all that should be required here. But if we probe a bit more deeply, we will
uncover some complexities. The argument depends on a speculation about what people
would do, and we do not know if the speculation can be supported. Perhaps most people
would clone themselves, or would seek clones of strangers who meet some genetic
minimum, and would not attempt to clone particular individuals with particular traits
and career paths. Perhaps this would be rare. Probably those who cloned people with
particular characteristics would, almost all of the time, treat their children with love and
respect. Here as elsewhere, strict scrutiny is not easy to satisfy, and here as elsewhere, a
widespread argument against human cloning seems to rest on weak grounds.
III. Therapeutic Cloning
Therapeutic cloning presents quite different issues.29 Here there is no effort to
create actual human beings. Children are not involved. My basic conclusion is that it is
not at all easy to argue that there is a fundamental right to engage in therapeutic
cloning – indeed, the argument for that right is weaker, as a legal matter, than the
argument for a right to engage in reproductive cloning. On the other hand, the
28
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justifications for banning therapeutic cloning are relatively weak – much weaker, in
fact, than the strongest justifications for banning reproductive cloning. To understand
the constitutional issues associated with a ban on therapeutic cloning, a brief
background is in order.
A. A (Very) Little Science
Here, in brief, is how therapeutic cloning would work. An embryo would be
created and allowed to grow for a short period, perhaps fourteen days or less. Its stem
cells would then be extracted and grown into human issue or a complete human organ
for transplant. The result of the process would not be a human being, but a piece of
nerve tissue, or a replacement organ, or a certain amount of skin. The goal would be to
grow replacement organs from a sample of someone’s DNA.
It is not clear if and when therapeutic cloning will succeed, but the potential
benefits are large. In theory, people could receive perfectly matched replacement
organs, with little or no danger of rejection of the transplant. Insulin-secreting cells
could be used to treat diabetes; nerve cells could be used for Parkinson’s disease or
strokes; liver cells could be used to repair damaged organs. There would be no need to
wait for the death of a donor. Nonreproductive cloning could also produce significant
benefits for knowledge and research, with eventual medical advances as well.
B. No Fundamental Right
Is there a fundamental right to engage in therapeutic cloning? The issue is quite
different from the case of reproductive cloning, for childbirth is not in any sense
involved. Hence the precedents that might support a right to reproductive cloning
cannot be invoked here. For constitutional purposes, the central question is whether
there is a presumptive right to select medical treatments. Those who seek to engage in
therapeutic cloning might be protected if the Constitution recognizes such a
presumptive right. We can imagine patients, or derivatively scientists and researchers,
urging that the right to privacy includes a presumptive right to noninterference with
choices among medical treatments that are crucial to people’s well-being.
At first glance, however, the mere statement of the question serves as an answer.
No Supreme Court decision suggests that there is any such right. Indeed, daily practice
argues against its existence. The Food and Drug Administration controls the kinds of
medicines that doctors may prescribe and that patients may choose. It would be
fanciful to attack those controls on constitutional grounds. Now perhaps it could be
urged that in the relevant cases, the FDA is attempting to protect people against fraud
or deception, or against the effects of their own ignorance, and that these are not the
grounds for forbidding nonreproductive cloning. Probably this is true. But the key
point is that the FDA is not required to justify its decisions in the terms of strict
scrutiny, on pain of constitutional invalidation.
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We have seen that it is not implausible to argue, on the strength of Roe v. Wade,
that the government would be required to produce a strong justification for any effort
to ban in vitro fertilization or surrogacy arrangements. But nothing in Roe v. Wade
supports to right to choose medical treatments. Recall that the Court has upheld a ban
on physician-assisted suicide, applying rational basis review.30 If people do not have a
right to choose death, it is unlikely that they have a right to a particular set of medical
experiments that might ultimately benefit them. Or consider another analogy:
scientific experiments on animals. Must the government justify a limitation on such
experiments in the terms of strict scrutiny, simply because important medical advances
might result? This is most doubtful. No court has ever suggested that strict scrutiny
will apply to government efforts to protect animals in the process of experimentation.
I do not mean to suggest that the area lacks complexities. Perhaps it could be
argued that while there is no right to die, there is a right to live, and that when a
patient seeks to use medical technology that is the (only) means of saving his life, that
the government should be required to produce an unusually convincing justification.
This is not entirely implausible. But it would go well beyond the existing precedents,
and it would also have the disadvantage of requiring careful judicial oversight of
numerous decisions by the FDA. One of my general themes has been the value of
judicial deference, under the due process clause, in the face of complex disputes of
fact and value. A posture of deference makes best sense here as elsewhere.31
C. Elusive Justifications
What interests support a ban on therapeutic cloning? The answer is not simple.
Those who object to therapeutic cloning tend to believe that personhood begins at
conception, and that the state should not use “persons” for the benefit of others. Is this
an adequate justification? In the case of rational basis review?
It might be tempting to say that this justification is inadequate after Roe v.
Wade. In Roe, after all, the Court held that the interest in protecting fetal life was not
sufficient to justify a ban on cloning. But the temptation should be resisted. Roe holds
only that the interest in protecting fetal life is inadequate to override the woman’s right
to choose; it does not hold that the interest is illegitimate or weightless. It seems clear
that government can make it a crime to kill first-trimester fetuses, whether they are
inside women’s wombs or in the laboratory; and to justify such a prohibition, it is not
necessary for government to say that first-trimester fetuses are human beings.
But what is the reason for forbidding nonreproductive cloning? Those who
object to therapeutic cloning may be unsure whether personhood begins at
conception, but may nonetheless press two points. First, they may think that the use of
human pre-embryos is itself a moral wrong. Second, they may urge that the use of
human embryos could tend to have subtle but ultimately corrosive effects on human
30
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values, in a way that will lead to an assortment of problems. If rational basis review is
at work, these points should be sufficient to support the ban as a matter of
constitutional law. I do not mean to endorse the claims in principle. Why is it a moral
wrong to use pre-embryos in the suggested way? Animals are frequently used as
means; most of these uses are lawful; and at least some of them seem morally
acceptable. Do pre-embryos have such a strong claim to protection? Or consider the
view that human values will be corroded by nonreproductive cloning. Why, exactly,
should this be feared, if nonreproductive cloning is not itself morally wrong for the
purposes and in the circumstances I am describing? The empirical claim seems most
doubtful.
Perhaps the real argument is that early embryos have the “potential” to become
human beings, and are worthy of moral concern for that reason.32 But this argument
seems weak too. Sperm cells have “potential,” and (not to put a fine point on it) most
people are not especially solicitous about them. If scientists will be using and cloning
embryos only at a very early stage when they are just a handful of cells (say, before
they are four days old), there appears to be no good reason for a ban.
Perhaps the strongest ground for banning nonreproductive cloning has nothing
to do with these points. Perhaps it is a different sort of empirical claim, to the effect
that a ban on nonreproductive cloning is a necessary means for enforcing the ban on
reproductive cloning. It might be feared that if nonreproductive cloning is permitted,
some people, at some point, will inevitably use the pre-embryos in the forbidden way,
so as to produce, or to try to produce, children. Here too there are many doubts. If
reproductive cloning is a crime, should we really fear that nonreproductive cloning
would be used for that by hypothesis unlawful end? But if rational basis review is at
work, this justification should be sufficient.
V. Concluding Remarks on Cloning and Substantive Due Process
This has been a lawyer’s essay, exploring the constitutional issue, not the
question of policy. I have argued that bans on cloning are constitutional, not that they
are a good idea.
With respect to substantive due process, I have offered a general claim. The
Court should be most reluctant to invoke the due process clause to strike down
legislation on substantive grounds. Where the Court has acted, it has usually done so
because of an implicit understanding that the case did not simply involve substantive
due process. In cases involving sexuality and reproduction, a question of sex equality
was also involved. The argument for a cautious approach to the due process clause
depends in part on a belief that the idea of “substantive due process” is awkward as a
matter of text and history. But it also depends on a belief in judicial fallibility,
especially in the domain of complex facts and contested values. Simply because of its
complexity, the area of cloning is a prime arena for judicial deference. Unless there is
some problem in the process that led to the law under review, courts should be hesitant
32
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to interpose their own views, at least outside of the most egregious cases. Tradition is
indeed relevant here, at least as a way of undertaking the inquiry into egregiousness;
an unprecedented intrusion is likely to be especially egregious. Tradition does not
exhaust the substantive content of the due process clause. But the intrusion marked by
bans on cloning does not rise to the level of intrusions the Court has marked for
invalidation; and that is sufficient for my basic conclusion here.
I have argued that there is no constitutional right to clone human beings for
reproductive purposes, and hence a ban on cloning, for those purposes, would and
should be upheld. I have also argued that there is no constitutional right to clone
human beings for therapeutic purposes. In both cases, the Constitution does not create
a presumptively protected right -- and hence the government is not required to show
more than a rational justification for its actions. In both cases, the government has
such a justification. In the case of reproductive cloning, the best argument is the least
sectarian – that a ban is necessary to protect against human suffering. In the case of
therapeutic cloning, a ban is far harder to justify. But so long as rationality review is at
work, it is probably sufficient to say that the ban on therapeutic cloning is a means of
making the ban on reproductive cloning effective.
At the same time, the analysis has shown that many of the standard objections to
human cloning are extremely weak. Some of those objections depend on ignorance
and confusion, or on a kind of half-remembered message from old science fiction
movies. By itself, repugnance should not be, in principle, an adequate justification for
law. An unintended byproduct of a discussion of the constitutional issue may be to
take some small steps toward something that is long overdue and much needed in the
political arena: A disaggregation of the issues that are involved in reproductive and
nonreproductive cloning, and a separation of the diverse, sometimes strong, but
sometimes implausible grounds that are invoked on behalf of statutory bans in both
domains.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@midway.uchicago.edu
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